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1 On record, the smallest community association that has availed
of the CMP consists of nine households. Initially, there was no ceil-
ing in the number of households per community but later, a ceiling
of 300 households was imposed. Communities with more than 300
households are therefore encouraged to split into two or more asso-
ciations.
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roup credit refers to a lending arrangement
whereby a financial or nonfinancial institution
offers to provide a loan to organized groups
mainly for the purpose of re-lending said amount
to separate potential borrowers (Huppi and Feder 1990).
This scheme has been widely applied to livelihood projects
but is less popular for housing. Ordinarily, households do
not have sufficient cash to purchase housing units. Thus,
long-term financing becomes necessary to allow for
homeownership. Traditional lenders, however, have low pref-
erence for low-cost houses as collateral compared to other
real estate properties. The underdeveloped secondary mar-
kets in many developing countries further pose higher risks
on mortgage financing. As such, providing shelter to urban
poor communities through group lending poses a challenge
to housing finance.
Some examples of group loans for housing are those
implemented by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Self-Em-
ployed Women’s Association Bank (SEWA Bank) in India and
Thrift and Credit Cooperative Societies in Sri Lanka. These
loans are mainly for home improvements and are on short-
term (5 years or less) basis. They are provided for a small
group of about five families and as additional service to
groups/borrowers who have availed of microenterprise loans
or have good loan performances in livelihood projects. So
far, these projects have shown good repayment performance
(Ferguson 1999).
In the Philippines, meanwhile, the group lending
scheme for housing is more revolutionary. In particular, the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP) implements a group
lending scheme among communities of “informal” settlers.
The loan is used mainly for the purchase of a piece of land
and has a maturity of 25 years. The size of the group ranges
from 9 to 300 households1 and no financial track record is
required of each individual household. The CMP has shown
a higher loan collection efficiency rate compared to other
government-implemented housing finance programs for low-
income households but repayment performance is unsus-
tainable and highly variable among communities.June 2004
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Thus, while the CMP has been
generally accepted as a pro-poor hous-
ing program and supported by most
local government units (LGUs) and
nongovernment organizations (NGOs),
its financial sustainability has to be
dealt with.
It is in this context that this
Policy Notes examines the key ele-
ments that affect the repayment be-
havior of households in the CMP.
Overview of group loans
under CMP
The CMP which came into existence
in late 1988 is designed to assist le-
gally organized associations of land-
less urban poor to purchase and de-
velop a tract of land for residential
purpose. The loan program works on
the principle of incremental develop-
ment whereby housing loans are
availed of in phases: (a) phase 1 cov-
ers land acquisition; (b) phase 2, site
development; and (c) phase 3 involves
home improvement.
The bulk of CMP loans, however, covered only the first
phase. Very few projects included two or all of the phases
of development in a single loan application because this
scheme is not affordable to poor households.
The basic features of the CMP are presented in Table
1. The community through the originator or partner organi-
zation applies for a loan from the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC). The NHMFC requires the pres-
ence of originators not only to assist the community in orga-
nizing and applying for loans but also to act as guarantor.
The loan amount is dependent on the value of land as agreed
upon by the landowner and community and as appraised by
the NHMFC.2
________________
2 In cases when NHMFC’s appraised value is lower than the
land price agreed upon, the community and household have to pro-
vide additional equity.
Loan performance of CMP projects
For the last fifteen years (1989 to October 2003), the CMP
has financed 1,109 projects nationwide, benefiting 138,871
households (Table 2). The total loan released in mortgage
take-out amounted to P4.3 billion and the average loan size
per household is about P30,000.
The overall collection efficiency ratio (CER) of the CMP
was 80.2 percent as of end 2002 (Table 3) but the general
pattern shows repayments below 80 percent in most years
and the program has yet to achieve the minimum ratio of 85
percent to be sustainable.
Table 4 further shows that the CER varies by type of
project, originator and size of community. On-site projects
show statistically higher loan recovery compared to off-site
projects. This is further reflected in the CMP accounts that
are under litigation or have been written off. Bad projects
are noted to be more common under off-site conditions com-
pared to on-site projects (Table 5). In general, it has been
difficult to organize off-site communities because house-
Table 1. Basic features of CMP
Features Description
Target beneficiary Communities with member-families from the lowest 30 percent
income deciles, landless and occupants of blighted areas
Community/Group size Maximum of 300 households per communitya
Maturity 25 years
Interest rate Fixed at 6 percent per annum
Maximum loan value NCR and other highly urbanized areas: P80,000 per household
(as of 2002) Other areas: Undeveloped land – P45,000 per household
Developed land – P60,000 per household
Project type On-site:b A community that has settled in a contiguous land
which it has been informally occupying for a number of years.
Off site: A community to be relocated in a titled raw land.




a The group is required to be registered to have legal representation.
b A community qualified as on-site should be an existing community not later than February 1986.
c The management of the CMP has been transferred from the NHMFC to the Social Housing Finance
Corporation (SHFC) by virtue of Executive Order 272 of January 2004. The SHFC is a subsidiary of the
NHMFC; however, it may take some time before it is fully operational.
d Origination work has recently been suspended for national government agencies—the National Housing
Authority (NHA), Housing Guarantee Corporation (HGC), and the Bases Development Corporation (BDC)
which merged with the HGC. There are currently 27 LGUs accredited under the CMP. NGO originators are
further classified into those which have formally coalesced with the National Congress of CMP Originators
(NCCO) and those which have not. NCCO members regularly meet to do self-regulation activities.No. 2004-05 3
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holds are heteroge-
neous and are settled in
different places.3 The
motivation for coopera-
tion is also low—first, in-
come and livelihood
sources have yet to be
established in the relo-
cation area; and sec-
ond, positive group
norms like group soli-
darity and peer pressure
often have not yet been
established at the onset
of preparing the commu-
nity for a loan.4 Off-site
communities thus tend to be loosely formed compared to
on-site communities.5
The size of the community also affects repayment per-
formance, with smaller-sized communities exhibiting better
repayment performance than larger-sized ones. Big asso-
ciations tend to be very vulnerable to the formation of fac-
________________
3 The CMP tries to minimize the problem of heterogeneity by
requiring off-site projects to conform to a group “homogeneity” cri-
terion in that they should belong to a community under threat of
demolition (due to government infrastructure projects or court or-
der), or currently located in a danger zone (settlers under the bridge,
esteros, shorelines, etc.). Household earners belonging to the same
place of work, e.g., low-salaried workers employed in the same com-
pany, may also qualify as a homogeneous group. However, this re-
form was not sufficient to offset other factors.
4 Processes or agreements tend to be railroaded (e.g., land price,
beneficiary selection, site planning), making off-site projects vulner-
able to land overpricing and inclusion of nondeserving beneficiaries.
5 In on-site communities, functional and positive group norms
are readily established at the onset of preparing the community for a
loan and this is carried on up to the repayment period.
6 Collaboration between LGUs and NGOs has been a growing
trend in recent years. Examples of formal partnerships are those be-
tween Cebu City and the Pagtambayayong Foundation; Quezon City
and a consortium of NGOs (Harnessing Self-Initiatives and Knowl-
edge [HASIK], Foundation for the Development of the Urban Poor
[FDUP] and others); Muntinlupa and the Muntinlupa Develop-
ment Foundation; Naga and Community Organizing Philippine
Experience (COPE)-Naga; San Carlos City and the JFL Founda-
tion; and the Island Garden City of Samal and the Mindanao Land
Foundation.
tions and divisions (e.g., siding with candi-
dates during electoral exercises that develop
into personal issues among leaders) that may
jeopardize critical community formation es-
pecially at the early stage of the project. Group
size has indeed been recognized as an im-
portant factor for cooperation (Olson 1965).
Limiting the size of membership in associa-
tions has therefore been considered as a way
of ensuring group manageability and effec-
tive organizational undertaking.
In contrast, the CER across originators
is not statistically significant. While origina-
tion work varies in every originator, the dif-
ference is not that distinct because of col-
laborative work among originators.6
Why the poor repayment
performance of the CMP?
While community size and group solidarity for-
mation are major considerations in coopera-
tive undertakings, other factors such as ef-
Table 2. Loans granted, CMP, 1989 to October 2003
     
Year  Household-    Loan   Average Remarks
 Beneficiary  Amount  Loan per
     Reach (in pesos) Household
(No. of HHs)  (in pesos)
 
1989 3,199 62,442,738 19,519  
1990 12,440 237,374,140 19,081 From 1989 to 1995,
1991 5,772 119,323,046 20,067 financing for the CMP was
1992 4,923 129,882,537 26,383 sourced from provident 
1993 10,139 241,229,111 23,792 fund agencies (SSS, 
1994 11,690 283,828,558 24,236 GSIS & HDMF).
1995 9,290 282,512,518 30,410  
1996 10,192 311,985,102 30,611 Funds for the CMP were
1997 14,591 495,323,580 33,947 sourced from the General
1998 10,844 387,447,545 35,729 Appropriations legislated by
1999 5,668 209,191,621 36,907 Congress from 1996 to the
2000 6,088 196,458,622 32,270 present. For 2003, however,
2001 9,457 346,824,660 36,676 no budget was requested by
2002 12,331 484,616,631 39,301 the NHMFC for the CMP.
2003 12,247 529,430,835 43,229
Total 138,871 4,317,871,244 30,149
Source: National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
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fective management of communities, incentive problems and
free rider issues have a critical impact on repayment perfor-
mance of individual households.7
Incentives and awards system
The NHMFC has set up an incentives and awards system to
encourage good repayment performance of communities and
originators. For instance, discounts for early payments and
citations have been offered. Unfortunately, these incentives
have often not been provided. An adverse incentive and
awards system has in fact been noted in the conduct of the
program. Household members who pay in advance ahead
of the amortization schedule or who pay in full tend to be
“penalized” in that the association uses their advanced
payments to cover for those who have delayed payments.
This is being referred to in the vernacular as the tapal sys-
tem. Initially, this may lead to good cash flow management
of the association as a whole. The problem starts, though,
when individuals do not make good on delayed payments
and graduate into past due accounts. Thereupon, the ad-
vanced payments have been used up to cover delays or
nonpayments.8 Advanced payments or full payments, even
as they are reported faithfully to the NHMFC, are often not
provided or issued with individualized titles. Only certificates
of full payments are issued.
Community loan monitoring system
Originators assist communities in setting up monitoring sys-
tems specifically for loan payments. The standard practice
is the ledgering of individual household accounts done by
volunteers from the community. Voluntary work, however,
has often resulted in inadequate reports,
thereby resulting in monitoring and collection
problems. Some communities have shifted
to paid part-time workers from within or out-
side the community. While the recording sys-
tem has improved because of this, the shift
or transition has resulted in a backlog of
ledgering work and eventual slack in moni-
toring repayments. The backlog has made it
convenient for those who do not regularly pay
to slide into habitual nonpayment. Some com-
munities are able to catch up but others have
difficulty doing so because of low repayments.
Worst, collections are “temporarily borrowed”
by the officer(s) which have not been restored. As a result,
communities often have declining CERs, from an amortiza-
tion at 100 percent or over in the first month to around 80
________________
7 The issues identified are largely based on reports reviewed,
selected interviews of originators and qualitative observations of some
CMP projects.
8 In some cases, this information is kept from the person mak-
ing the advanced payments.
Table 4. Collection efficiency rating, CMP
(as of December 2002)
  CER (%) Standard
Deviation
  




By size (no. of beneficiaries)
< or = 200 88.06 43.82b
201 – 350 74.57 28.49
> 350 69.27 31.43
  
By originator
National Government Offices* 86.11 27.58c
LGU 89.38 64.33
NGO 84.11 27.44
     
a significant at a = 10%
b significant at a = 1%
c not significant
* NHA and HGC
Source of basic data: NHMFC
Table 5. CMP foreclosed accounts by project type
(as of December 2002)
Type of No. of Foreclosed % to Total Loan Amount   % to Total
Project       Accounts  Accounts (in P million) Loan Amount
 (no. of projects)
  
On-site 147 (815) 18.0 709.8 (2,764.56) 25.7
Off-site 73 (179) 40.8 427.1 (922.11) 46.3
Total 220 (994) 22.1 1136.9 (3,686.68) 30.8
     
( ) figures in parenthesis refer to total accounts or values.
Source of basic data: NHMFCNo. 2004-05 5
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to 90 percent in the next months to much lower for the rest
of the period.
Presence of recalcitrants
Recalcitrants are households within on-site projects which
refuse to become members of the community association.
The NHMFC allows the presence of recalcitrants up to a
maximum of 10 percent of total residing households in on-
site projects. Based on this policy, when a project is taken
out, that project will always be theoretically short of repay-
ment by at least 10 percent unless reduced by membership
conversions or community-initiated eviction. Projects with
the presence of recalcitrants therefore have the natural dis-
advantage of lower repayment rates.
Generally, recalcitrant behavior is motivated by any or
a combination of the following: (a) misinformation on con-
flicting property rights/title claims; (b) organizational issues
(including ideological) creating factions and leader-follower
and even personal loyalties; and (c) cases of households
who want to gain from land acquisition but refuse to be
integrated in the CMP (free-riders). Recalcitrant households
can create misinformation or can be used by “professional”
squatters to create dissension in the community.
Communities may make up for the nonpayment of plots
occupied by recalcitrants but this arrangement takes a toll
on the cumbersome computation of repayments and restored
accounts over time. In other cases, communities cull out
the plots of recalcitrant households from the approved sub-
division plan and allow them to negotiate individually with
landowners. This arrangement, however, is normally not ac-
ceptable to landowners.9
Extent of beneficiary substitution
A household is substituted when it moves out of the com-
munity for whatever reason (normally for better income op-
portunities) and as a result, is unable to continue its amor-
tization payments. Substitutions may be legal or illegal.
Based on CMP guidelines, a substitution is legal if the sub-
stituted household is approved by the association board
and later by the NHMFC. NHMFC approval, however, is very
slow, if at all occurring, which makes most association-ap-
proved substitutions technically illegal.
Illegal substitution may also take place when a ben-
eficiary sells his rights on the lot without the approval of the
association. The slack of completed substitutions contrib-
utes to low repayments. Noncooperative or recalcitrant mem-
bers may come from the substitutes. The substitute mem-
ber may also be the nonpoor households.10 While the pres-
ence of nonpoor households can improve the repayment
performance of a community, it may at the same time dis-
courage nonpayment by the “poorer” households. These
effects, however, still need to be further substantiated.
Presence of community-based financial facility
Communities that have started with directed and phased
savings to fund pre-take out expenses have shown viability
than those with no community-based savings program. This
scheme also proved to be a good indicator of member coop-
eration and financial track record. Likewise, the use of com-
munity-based financial facility has shown promising ways of
addressing low repayments and amortization fluctuations.11
A typical scheme is to create a savings fund by pooling the
individual savings of households. This may be undertaken
by a small group or the community organization at large.12
The fund is used as a credit facility that is made available to
the contributors for amortization and provident purposes on
a short-term basis. Interest rate is determined by the con-
tributors and may vary from zero to 6 percent monthly interest.
Site selection and planning
Projects that are uninhabitable or less habitable often have
problems on repayment. Both on-site and off-site projects
are required to have site plans and environmental clear-
ance from the Department of Environment and Natural Re-
sources (DENR) and approved subdivision development per-
mit from the LGU. However, since the actual physical devel-
opment of the project site is still to be undertaken, there
________________
9 In the Bucana cluster of 16 community associations undergo-
ing loan applications with the CMP, the landowners have allowed
this arrangement, albeit selectively, to some recalcitrants.
10 In Cebu City, for instance, “informal settlements” are in-
creasingly attracting middle-income households who find these settle-
ments a convenient and inexpensive option for obtaining housing
compared to formal subdivisions provided by developers (Thirkell
1996).
11 Some examples are CMP communities assisted by FDUP
and Foundation for Development Alternatives (FDA) in NCR, Iloilo
Peoples Habitat (IPH) and Pagtambayayong in the Visayas, and the
Hugpong Dabaw in Mindanao.
12 Repayment rates have been noted to be higher in small groups
than those pooled at the community level.June 2004
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will be plots assigned to some members that may not be
immediately habitable or less habitable due to water log-
ging, flooding or ill-maintained access footpath or road.
Beneficiaries assigned to these areas often do not regularly
pay their monthly amortizations. This finding implies that
for housing loans, location-specific habitability of lots is criti-
cal and not simply a matter of people willing to cooperate
and be jointly liable.
Policy recommendations
Based on the above, the following are hereby being recom-
mended:
X There is a need to establish and strengthen col-
lective action and joint liability in CMP community organiza-
tions as an anchor of program sustainability. This requires
the CMP program to take into consideration key principles
that have evolved from experience on group lending for
microenterprises (Besley and Coate 1995; Zeller 1998).
These key principles are: (1) existence of internal rules
of conduct agreed upon by the members to increase trans-
parency and reduce intragroup frictions and costs of coordi-
nation; (2) existence of an internal monitoring system for
loan performances and noncooperative behaviors, among
others; and (3) reliance on member’s deposits rather than
on external sources to increase the borrower’s incentive to repay.
X There is a need to resolve land issues in group
lending for housing. In particular, site selection and plan-
ning are necessary conditions for a CMP scheme to work.
Inhabitability or less habitability of projects and plots should
be completely eliminated as reasons for nonrepayment.
Moreover, government (NHMFCs and LGUs) has to act on
ownership conflicts and titling problems and include the in-
dividualization of title as an important part of the incentive
system.
X Finally, some specific areas for action include:
z Focus on CMP on-site projects. Assisting off-site
projects should be done by exception.
z Develop and nurture LGU-NGO partnerships in
originator complementation work.
z Review and work on the reduction of current mem-
bership ceiling of 300 households per commu-
nity organization.
z Develop and implement training programs for origi-
nators on the proper facilitation of communities
on site selection and site planning.
z Reduce the allowable percentage of recalcitrants
to 5 percent. LGUs/NHMFC must immediately re-
solve issues on ownership claims and local fac-
tions.
z Facilitate individualization of titles and establish
a devoted unit in NHMFC.
z Review the nature of substitutions being under-
taken and its impact on CMP.
z Develop mainstream community-based financial fa-
cility as early as the pretake-out period, or belat-
edly, to already taken-out communities.      
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